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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent protection, as a part of the larger package of intellectual property
1
protection, plays a prominent role in today’s free trade agreement negotiations.
As the business of pharmaceuticals increases internationally, the degree of
protection nations incorporate into these agreements has a direct effect on access
2
to medicine around the world. As a matter of intellectual property, the premier
governing document is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
3
Property (“TRIPS”). TRIPS creates, at a minimum, floors which signatory
4
countries must implement into their respective domestic policies. In a postTRIPS world, however, we see countries increasingly relying on bilateral
5
agreements to achieve higher standards of intellectual property rights. These
higher standards have a particularly debilitating effect on how lower income
6
countries provide their citizens access to life-saving medication.
Scientific innovation in the area of anti-retroviral drugs has turned an HIVpositive diagnosis into something that is manageable, where just twenty years
7
ago it may have well been a death sentence. However, HIV/AIDS very much
remains an epidemic, especially in lesser-developed countries where access to
8
anti-retrovirals is a problem. Providing treatment for HIV/AIDS is about much
more than improving quality of life for those infected, it is about curbing the
9
rapid spread of the virus. Access to these medicines, however, remains a
10
problem for middle to low-income countries. In 2010, for example, UNAIDS
1. See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 47, 47 (2002).
2. See id. at 58-59.
3. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 231-32
(2002).
4. Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough—The Notion of Binding Ceilings in
International Intellectual Property Protection 9 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax
Law Research Paper Series No. 09-01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429; see also Henning
Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade
Agreements: Towards Safeguarding Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 328-29 (2011) (discussing
whether treaty interpretation norms allow the policy flexibilities found in TRIPS to be preserved despite higher
protections in TRIPS-plus agreements).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See Ruse-Kahn, supra note 4, at 329-30.
7. See UNAIDS, OUTLOOK REPORT OF JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS 64-71
(2011), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/
2011/20110607_jc2069_30outlook_en.pdf (tracking the progress of treatments developed for HIV/AIDS over
the last thirty years); Miles D. White, Drug Patents Are Good for Our Health, PHRMA.ORG,
http://www.phrma.org/drug-patents-are-good-our-health (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
8. See generally MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF ANTIRETROVIRAL PRICE
REDUCTIONS (14th ed. 2011), available at apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18716en/
s18716en.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Horace E. Anderson, Jr., We Can Work it Out: Co-Op Compulsory Licensing as the Way Forward in
Improving Access to Anti-Retroviral Drugs, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 167, 171 (2010).
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reported that the adult HIV prevalence was five percent in Sub-Saharan Africa;
11
globally, 2.5 million children under the age of fifteen are living with HIV. In
contrast to those numbers, only twenty-eight percent of patients outside of North
12
America have access to anti-retroviral therapy.
“Access” in this context means much more than physical access; in many
cases, the drugs exist but are priced far out of reach. Existing free trade
agreements, and new agreements that are being negotiated, such as the TransPacific Partnership Agreement (“TPPA”), affect a country’s intellectual property
scheme which, in turn, affects how quickly new drugs become available in both
13
the physical and pricing sense. As such, the humanitarian and public health
voice can be heard loud and clear amidst today’s trade negotiations dealing with
14
international intellectual property protections. This voice sees access to health
15
as a fundamental human right not to be ignored.
Also prominent is the voice of the “market fundamentalist,” urging higher
patent protection, the absence of which, they argue, would stifle further innovation
16
by lowering incentives. Pharmaceuticals are unique in that many research and
17
development endeavors end in failure. Furthermore, the costs of research and
18
development are a significant portion of the total production cost. In turn, even
the smallest return on investment from a successful product keeps the incentive for
19
more research and development alive. In the context of AIDS medication, Abbot
Pharmaceuticals’ CEO poses a question: AIDS “is a disease that is always new—
due to the constant evolution of the virus—and requires new solutions. Where will
20
these come from if we hobble the patent system that drives innovation?” Given
the foregoing, this argument makes sense. However, what if, on a global scale,
intellectual property rights become so extreme that they begin to discourage

11 UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at www.unaids.org/documents/201011
23_FS_Global_em_en.pdf.
12. Id. at 2.
13. See infra Part IV for a discussion on intellectual property rights-related negotiations for the TransPacific Partnership Agreement.
14. See, e.g., JOSEPH BRENNER & ELLEN R. SHAFFER, CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS ON TRADE & HEALTH,
COMMENTS CONCERNING PROPOSED UNITED STATES-TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP TRADE AGREEMENT 17 (2010),
available at http://www.cpath.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/p-cpathontpp1-25-2010.pdf (recommending that
the TPPA not contain any TRIPS-plus provisions).
15. Anderson, Jr., supra note 10, at 176-77; see also Ellen ‘t Hoen, Report of the Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health: A Call to Governments, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 421, 422 (2006), available at www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/421.pdf. The World Health
Organization uses framework set forth by the United Nations to define the “right to health”: availability,
acceptability, accessibility and quality. See id. This Comment deals with intellectual property policy that affects
accessibility by keeping medicines priced out of reach for many.
16. Anderson, Jr., supra note 10, at 177-79; see Sykes, supra note 1, at 60-62.
17. Sykes, supra note 1, at 61.
18. Id. at 60.
19. See id.
20. White, supra note 7.
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pharmaceutical innovation and competition, all the while stifling access to lifesaving drugs? This result is not good for either side of the debate.
In Part II, this Comment lays out the provisions of TRIPS and the changes
made by the Doha Declaration on Public Health (“DOHA Declaration”). This is a
necessary foundation to any discussion about intellectual property rights and public
health. Part III will examine TRIPS-plus intellectual property rights: data
exclusivity, parallel importation, and patent/registration linkage. It will focus on the
effects these higher protections have on access to essential medicines, such as antiretrovirals, in developing countries. In addition, Part III will discuss how to
reconcile these intellectual property rights with the DOHA Declaration, and
explore the Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) as an example of
a TRIPS-plus agreement. Finally, Part IV will examine negotiations and proposed
text for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
This Comment will conclude with a recommendation that a socially
responsible Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement should not include the extensive
TRIPS-plus protections seen in recent bilateral trade agreements. While still in
negotiations, even a potential Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement that
21
22
incorporates unconditional data exclusivity, patent/ registration linkage, and a
23
prohibition of parallel importation can only serve to pad the monetary interests of
24
the already-thriving pharmaceutical industry. At the same time, it would further
stifle access to life-saving drugs in already-struggling, lesser-developed countries.
Lastly, it is not enough to provide a textual acknowledgement to TRIPS
flexibilities and the DOHA Declaration on Public Health if the actual provisions do
not allow for public health improvements through access in the poorest corners of
25
the world.
II. THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DOHA DECLARATION ON PUBLIC HEALTH
A. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Before 1995, a comprehensive agreement did not exist to provide
26
international intellectual property protection. This being the case, nations were

21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.C.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. Press Release, Jerry Carey, Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., Authors Dispute "Innovation Crisis"
among Pharmaceutical Companies (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.umdnj.edu/cgi-bin/
cgiwrap/hpappweb/newsroom.cgi?month=08&day=08&year=12&headline=Authors+Dispute++Innovation+Cri
sis++among+Pharmaceutical+Companies.
25. Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and
Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 Nw. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 7 (2006).
26. Frederick M. Abbot & Jerome H. Rechman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for
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free to fashion their own patent system, some excluding pharmaceuticals from
27
patent protection altogether. TRIPS was a landmark attempt to remedy this gap
in the body of international trade law by providing minimum levels of intellectual
28
property protection. TRIPS is a supplemental agreement to that which created
29
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1994, and adherence to TRIPS is a
30
requirement of WTO membership. This relationship forced countries to evaluate
the value of WTO membership as a whole, despite “any detriment from
31
providing protection to foreign intellectual property.” By including sweeping
intellectual property mandates in agreements with broad subject-matter coverage
(like potentially the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement), developing countries
may accede because the trade benefits carry greater weight than the potential
32
harm of the chapter on intellectual property. The likely compromise in this
situation is built-in exceptions. As is true with negotiations of today’s free-trade
agreements, the disparate intellectual property policies and concerns of
developed versus developing countries resulted in TRIPS containing certain
exemptions to the patent provisions of TRIPS, often referred to as
33
“flexibilities.”
TRIPS mandates that member countries provide patents for “any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are
34
new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.”
Patents must provide the holder with exclusive rights to prevent development,
35
use, sale, and importation by others without consent of the patent holder. Article
31 provides a major exception, or flexibility, to these baseline requirements:
36
compulsory licensing.

the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 921, 927 (2007).
27. Id.
28. See Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, As Measured By Compulsory Licensing,
18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 369 (2011).
29. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 231-32.
30. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 25-26 (2006).
31. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 3.
32. CHOW & LEE, supra note 30.
33. Sykes, supra note 1, at 50-55. In addition to the flexibilities, TRIPS members also operate on
different deadlines for implementing treaty provisions to account for the many countries which are at a lesser
stage of economic development. CHOW & LEE, supra note 30.
34. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, § 1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1896 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
35. Id.
36. Id. at art. 31.
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B. Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS
37

Compulsory licensing remains a controversial public-health resource. The
basic tenet of compulsory licensing is that it allows a government or governmentapproved third party, usually a generic manufacturer, to obtain limited use rights
38
for a drug without the patent owner’s consent. TRIPS provides conditions that
must be met before a compulsory license may be issued. It prescribes, in
pertinent part, that a proposed user must first make efforts to negotiate
39
authorization on “reasonable commercial terms and conditions.” If, after a
“reasonable period of time” these negotiations have failed, a compulsory license
40
may be granted. However, the subsection also provides exceptions, providing
for waiver of the negotiation period in cases of national emergency, extreme
urgency, non-commercial use by the government, or to remedy anti-competitive
41
practices. Once granted, a compulsory license does not come with the same
42
exclusivity rights as a patent. Just as compulsory licenses may only be issued in
43
limited situations, the rights associated with the license are equally limited.
Especially relevant to this discussion is the requirement that the use “be
44
authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.” In practice,
this provision highlights one of TRIPS’ shortcomings, at least from the vantage
45
point of developing countries and humanitarians. Many of the least-developed
countries lack the manufacturing capability to produce drugs domestically under
46
a compulsory license. It follows that many of the countries for which this
47
flexibility was intended would be unable to utilize the flexibility.
In 2001, faced with a growing HIV/AIDS crisis, South Africa enacted a piece
of legislation that issued a compulsory license to produce AIDS medicines to
37. See e.g., Harris, supra note 28, at 383-96 (evaluating the success or failure of the TRIPS agreement
measure by the various usage of compulsory licensing by members to the agreement and restrictions on the
licensing in subsequent agreements).
38. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
39. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 31(b).
40. Id.
41. Id. at art. 31(b)-(k). The 2001 Doha Declaration makes clear that member countries have “the right
to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” and explicitly
categorizes a crisis related to HIV/AIDS as one such circumstance. World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, para. 1, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
42. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 31(b)-(k)
43. Id. The terms and conditions in Article 31 “weakened compulsory licensing as an access tool by,
among other things, requiring negotiations with the patent holder…limiting the scope and duration…, and
limiting compulsory licensing to use in supplying the domestic (non-export) market.” Anderson, Jr., supra note
10.
44. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 31(f).
45. Harris, supra note 28, at 386.
46. Id. at 384-86.
47. Id. at 387.

218

[9] BUCCI 2-31-13 FIX.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 4:05 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26
48

local manufacturers. However, the new law also allowed the country to import
49
the drugs from countries that produced it at a lower cost than the patent owner.
In response, the patent owners filed suit, claiming that the legislation violated
TRIPS because the law “allowed the South African health minister to act
unilaterally without first having to prove a drug manufacturer abused its patent,”
and issued compulsory licenses without first obtaining the patent owners’
50
consent. The suit was eventually dismissed but it was this landscape that gave
rise to the DOHA Declaration on Public Health and the subsequent TRIPS
51
amendment.
C. The DOHA Declaration on Public Health
In 2001, the World Trade Organization released the Declaration on the
52
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Though it is not a legally binding
amendment to TRIPS, the Declaration is persuasive authority for interpretation of
53
what TRIPS requires, especially regarding compulsory licensing. The
Declaration lends public health-oriented interpretative guidance to TRIPS
provisions by highlighting the “gravity of the public health problems afflicting
many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
54
HIV/AIDS . . . .” Further, the Declaration expressly asserts that TRIPS “can and
should be interpreted in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect
55
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”
While the Declaration clarified that HIV/AIDS satisfied the national
emergency requirement, it also expressly declined to address the issue of parallel
56
57
imports, leaving it open for individual Member regulation. The Declaration
also urged the TRIPS Council to find an “expeditious solution” to the problem
posed in countries, like South Africa, with “insufficient or no manufacturing
58
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.” The solution, first implemented
59
through an interim waiver and now in a proposed amendment, allows a country

48. Id. at 384-86.
49. Id. This concept is called parallel importation and is discussed, infra, Part III.B.
50. Id. at 384-85.
51. Id. at 384-86; see infra Part II.C.
52. Doha Declaration, supra note 41.
53. Sykes, supra note 1, at 54.
54. Doha Declaration, supra note 41, at para. 1.
55. Id.
56. See infra Part III.B (discussing parallel importation of drugs).
57. Doha Declaration, supra note 41, at para. 5(d).
58. Id.
59. Laura Chung, Use of Paragraph 6 System for Access to Medicine, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
137, 143 (2010). To amend TRIPS permanently, the amendment must be ratified by two-thirds of WTO
members. Though less than a third of member countries have formally accepted the amendment, the interim
waiver will continue to apply until ratification is complete. The deadline for ratification has been extended a
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that is incapable of manufacturing generics under a compulsory license to legally
60
import generics from countries that do possess the manufacturing capacity.
III. COMMON FEATURES OF A TRIPS-PLUS AGREEMENT
This Part will discuss those TRIPS-plus intellectual property rights that have
been proposed by the United States in Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
negotiations. It will conclude with brief discussion of the Central American Free
Trade Agreement as an example of an agreement that contains these provisions.
A. Data Exclusivity
TRIPS requires member countries to take measures to protect data (e.g.
testing data) against “unfair commercial usage,” production of which “involves a
considerable effort,” if data submission is a condition to market approval of
61
products containing a new chemical entity. The United States and European
Union, in implementing TRIPS into their respective laws, provide for data
62
exclusivity. The United States, for example, provides for five years of test data
63
(and marketing) exclusivity for new chemical entities. This means that a generic
drug application containing the same new chemical entity may not be registered
64
until the end of the fifth year. However, because it takes, on average, eighteen
months for the generic drug to be approved, the brand drug effectively enjoys
65
marketing exclusivity longer than five years. In contrast, EU patent holders
enjoy eight years of data exclusivity plus an additional two years of marketing

third time to December 31, 2013. Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated May 29, 2012).
60. Harris, supra note 28, at 386. This waiver, however, has only been used once, between Canada as the
exporter and Rwanda as the importer. Harris argues that the lack of use of the amendment is due to the process
for utilizing it being complicated and disjointed, fear of retaliation, and bilateral trade restrictions. See id. at
391-94.
61. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 39.3. As the language used in this provision is broad, there is a debate
over whether Article 39.3 really requires data exclusivity by its language or whether protection below the level
of exclusivity would suffice. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 443, 446-65, 499 (2004) (examining the language of Article 39.3 and advocating for a solution that
preserves incentives to create via trade secret protection without impeding access to medicines in developing
countries).
62. Fellmeth, supra note 61, at 447-48.
63. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2001). A “new chemical entity” is a drug in which the molecule or ion
responsible for the drug’s physiological or pharmacological action has not been approved by the Federal Drug
Administration in any other application. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2011).
64. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2).
65. MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA & PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 59 (2005); Fiona M. Scott Morton, Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising,
and Generic Entry in the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1085, 1090 (2000).
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exclusivity. In effect, a generic application may not be registered until the end
of the data exclusivity period and may not be launched into the market until after
67
marketing exclusivity has lapsed.
In bilateral trade agreements subsequent to TRIPS, the United States has
pushed for, and achieved, data exclusivity provisions, as opposed to the lower
68
threshold of simple data protection. This is not a surprising move, given the
position of United States that TRIPS requires a period of exclusivity for
marketing data:
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has interpreted
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement to mean that “the data will not be
used to support, clear or otherwise review other applications for
marketing approval for a set amount of time . . . . Any other definition of
this term would be inconsistent with logic and the negotiating history of
69
the provision.”
Construing Article 39.3 this strictly is probably above the minimum standard
70
that TRIPS creates. Professor Brook K. Baker argues that the language used in
Article 39.3 does not support mandating data exclusivity as the only logical
71
interpretation.
Notwithstanding compulsory licensing schemes, data exclusivity generally
72
delays the availability of generic medicines, which are typically sold at more
73
affordable prices than their branded counterparts. The potential delay is caused
74
by two implications of a data exclusivity scheme. The first is that a generics
manufacturer, in lieu of waiting for the exclusivity period to expire, would need

66. EUROPEAN COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY PRELIMINARY REPORT 107-08 (Nov. 28,
2008) (DG Competition Staff Working Paper), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/
pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf.
67. Id. at 108.
68. Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 783-84 (2010).
69. CARLOS MARIA CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 47 (2002) (quoting the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative interpreting Article 39.3 of the TRIPS agreement in an unattributed paper for
submission in bilateral discussions with Australia in May, 1995).
70. See id. at 48.
71. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/
Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 315 (2008).
72. Access to Medicines: Data Exclusivity and Other “TRIPS-Plus” Measures, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Mar. 2006), http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Global_Trade_and_Health_GTH_No3.pdf [hereinafter Access
to Medicines]; see also Yu, supra note 68, at 78 (“Such delay, along with the reduced price competition, is
likely to prolong, or even exacerbate, the massive public health crises in less developed countries. It is also
wasteful and highly undesirable to require duplicative testing in countries that have very limited economic
resources.”).
73. David W. Freeman, Prescription Drug Prices Set to Fall as Patents Expire, CBS NEWS (July 25,
2011, 11:37 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20082918-10391704.html.
74. Access to Medicines, supra note 72.
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75

to repeat clinical trials for and produce their own data. Second, in a more
common scenario, a generics manufacturer would need to wait until the
76
exclusivity period is over to launch their product.
B. Parallel Importation
Parallel importation is one way that a country can reduce drug costs by
procuring the drug at a price lower than what is available locally, assuming that
77
the savings are passed on to the consumer. Under this scheme, once a drug has
been sold with the consent of the patent owner anywhere in the world, the rights
are said to be exhausted and the owner may not protest importation into a
78
different country. Allowing parallel importation “favors consumer interests and
access to medicine, because countries are free to import products from the
79
country where they are legitimately sold for the lowest possible price.” On the
other hand, pharmaceutical business models rely on price differentials for
80
different markets. Allowing parallel imports means these differentials would be
moot, as the consumer would be able to find and then import the drug at its
81
82
cheapest. As TRIPS is silent on this issue and the DOHA Declaration
83
expressly leaves resolution of the issue up to each member country, the parallel
import restrictions are on the table in today’s trade negotiations. Because
restrictions on parallel trade affect pricing differentials, the World Health
Organization notes that it may be beneficial for developed countries to include
restrictions in their domestic laws to preserve lower pricing in developing
84
countries. On the other hand, developing countries may benefit from less
85
restriction on parallel imports.
There are, of course, moral implications of allowing parallel imports for
86
some markets but not others. The first is the temptation to divert drugs intended
87
for a developing country into a high-income, developed country. The second is

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 123
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealth Report.pdf.
78. Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1469, 1501 n.147 (2007).
79. Id. at 1501.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. TRIPS, supra note 34.
83. Doha Declaration, supra note 41.
84. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 77, at 124.
85. See id.
86. See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in Inte-rnational
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 265-68 (2005).
87. See id. at 266-67.
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the temptation for a market consumer with the means to pay for the drug to
substitute it with drugs imported at a cheaper cost, which are intended for poorer
88
populations. One remedy is a ban on parallel importing and reliance on pricing
89
differentials. However, the better remedy is for developed countries to monitor
90
borders and criminalize diversion practices. Kevin Outterson suggests that this
can be combined with persuasive appeals to the consumer’s morals: if you are a
high-income patient who takes a pill clearly intended for the impoverished, you
91
are stealing from the poor. Furthermore, he argues, the burden of anti-diversion
measures should fall on high-income markets because that is where the necessary
92
resources and infrastructure for implementation exist.
In the context of trade-negotiations, the concept of parallel imports and
necessary considerations illustrate that a one-size-fits-all approach will not work
when negotiating an agreement between countries of disparate development and
93
income levels. Thus, in a potential agreement like the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, regulation of parallel importation should be left to individual
94
countries.
C. Patent/Registration Linkage
Patent/registration linkage is a relatively new patent concept, first appearing
in the domestic policies of the United States and Canada about twenty-five years
95
ago. Traditionally, the regulatory body governing drug registration and approval
96
functions independently from the patent system. With a linkage regulatory
system, however, the two processes are “linked” and the drug regulatory body
97
becomes a patent enforcer.

88. See id. at 266.
89. EU Commission Extends Ban on Parallel Imports, PHARM. INDUS. NEWS (Oct. 16, 1995),
http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/68996/eu-commission-extends-ban-on-parallel-imports.html.
90. See Outterson, supra note 86, at 266-67.
91. See id. at 266
92. See id. at 265-66 (The European Union, which practices community exhaustion, permits parallel
trade within the European Economic Area. To identify products for the poor, all pharmaceuticals exported from
the European Union bear a distinguishing logo).
93. See One Size Fits All Will Not Work in Trade Negotiations: Kamal Nath—Inequitous System Will Hit
Trade Flows from Developed Countries, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.
carnegieendowment.org/files/pressrelease.pdf.
94. See Intellectual Licensing—Structuring Deals Worldwide, LADAS & PARRY LLP, http://www.
ladas.com/IPProperty/GrayMarket/GrayMa02.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
95. See Ron A. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage
Regulation for Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 71, 134 (2011) (The United States
implemented a linkage regime with passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984).
96. Laba Karki, NEIFELD IP LAW, P.C., Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The HatchWaxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, at 1-2,
http://www.neifeld.com/pubs/reviewoffdalawrelatedtopharm.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
97. Baker, supra note 71, at 307.
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98

The Hatch-Waxman Act in the United States illustrates how linkage works
99
in regards to a generics application. When generics producers want to file an
equivalent of an already-registered drug with the Food and Drug Administration,
they must first certify that “there were no competing patents, that all patents had
expired, that the registration would not become final until patent expiration, or
100
that the alleged patent was invalid or would not be infringed.” In the case
where the filer is certifying invalidity or non-infringement, notice must be
provided to the patent holder, who then has forty-five days to bring an action for
101
infringement. This results in an influx of costly litigation and further delay of
generics, despite the fact that oftentimes the outcome of the litigation is
102
invalidation of the registered patent. Further, this is inappropriate because a
legal presumption of validity is established for the registered patent on the health
103
regulation end, despite a generic meeting the technical requirements to register.
In contrast, EU “[h]ealth authorities have no legal capacity to look into
[intellectual property rights] issues and deny approval to an application that
conforms to the relevant technical standards, even if there [was a patent]
104
infringement . . . .” It should be noted, however, that some EU member nations
have attempted to implement linkage regimes despite it being a prohibited
105
practice. Furthermore, recent free trade agreements (“FTAs”) have addressed
106
patent/registration linkage by either strongly encouraging implementation or
107
mandating it.
To understand the serious implications of a linkage regime, it is important to
recognize that the vast majority of new patents are for drugs other than new
108
chemical entities. Most patents obtained are for the same drug in a different
product by patenting a different pharmaceutical formulation (different
administration form of the same active ingredient), or a combination of known
109
drugs. This allows an experienced pharmaceutical company to layer their
patents with little innovative efforts, effectively extending the patent term via the
110
cumulative impact of multiple patents. Not only does this hurt pharmaceutical
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006) (abbreviated new drug applications).
99. Baker, supra note 71, at 307.
100. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
101. Baker, supra note 71, at 307.
102. Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating The WTO System for Access to
Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 91 (2004).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 90.
105. Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure-Function Analysis of Global Pharmaceutical Linkage
Regulations, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 391 (2011).
106. Baker, supra note 71, at 340.
107. See supra Part III.D. (discussing CAFTA as an example of a linkage-mandating FTA).
108. Correa, supra note 102, at 89.
109. Id. at 89 nn.37-38.
110. Bouchard, supra note 95, at 105 (highlighting Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer’s assertion that
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innovation, it also causes extraordinary market-entry delay for the generic
111
competitor. More troublesome is that TRIPS flexibilities are not equipped to
112
deal with this kind of restriction, and thus a loophole is created. When
combined with data exclusivity, granting a compulsory license is rendered
especially illusory, “as prospective compulsory licensees are unlikely to have
sufficient incentives to replicate test data, and governments cannot normally wait
113
until a new set . . . has been developed.”
D. Reconciling the DOHA Declaration and TRIPS Flexibilities in TRIPS-Plus
Agreements
Some scholarship suggests that while TRIPS certainly created a minimum
standard for intellectual property protection, there may also be binding “ceilings”
114
in place imposed by TRIPS and other sources of international law. Explicit in
TRIPS is the right, but not obligation, of signatories to provide higher intellectual
property protection than required, “provided that such protection does not
115
contravene the provisions” of TRIPS.
Without more specific language,
subsequent FTAs that limit TRIPS flexibilities would likely be upheld as consistent
116
with the tradition of TRIPS being a floor and not a ceiling.
Including language that preserves the flexibility found in TRIPS is important
because that language carries a great deal of interpretive power. The most
important flexibilities in regard to public health are found in the DOHA
Declaration; the best way to uphold these flexibilities in subsequent FTAs is to
incorporate similar or identical language, rather than language that is “ambiguous”
117
or “open-textured.” According to Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “the more
specifically or demandingly a clause refers to the DOHA Declaration, the more
118
effective it is in safeguarding TRIPS flexibilities . . . .” To the extent that the
DOHA Declaration continues to have legal significance, the members of the TransPacific Partnership are obligated to incorporate such specific language in order to

assessment of the impact made by Canada’s linkage regime must take into consideration the effect of multiple
patents).
111. Id. at 105.
112. Harris, supra note 28, at 394.
113. Correa, supra note 102, at 92.
114. Kur & Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 9; see also Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 350-64 (discussing
whether treaty interpretation norms allow the policy flexibilities found in TRIPS to be preserved despite higher
protections in TRIPS-plus agreements).
115. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 1:1.
116. Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 364.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 358.
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incorporate with certainty the public health-related aims embodied in the DOHA
119
Declaration.
CAFTA, to which the United States is a party, is a prime example of one such
agreement that contains significantly higher intellectual property protection than
120
what is required by TRIPS. While it does not place restrictions on parallel
121
122
importation, CAFTA requires data exclusivity and patent/registration linkage
of its member states. However, it also includes an affirmation of existing rights and
123
obligations under TRIPS. In addition, the parties to CAFTA released an
124
“understanding” regarding public health and creating access to medicines. This
release specifically acknowledges that CAFTA does not interfere with a member
state’s ability to address epidemics, including HIV/AIDS, and in “circumstances of
125
extreme urgency or national emergency.” This language, which reflects
provisions found in the DOHA Declaration, coupled with language affirming
specific TRIPS-flexibilities, is a good example of what is urged supra as a
126
necessary component of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. However,
even the most specific affirmation of public-health policy cannot remedy the
practical effects of an agreement that incorporates every major intellectual property
protection available (data-exclusivity, patent extensions, patent/registration
linkage, and restrictions on parallel importation), and it appears that the TransPacific Partnership Agreement is headed toward a similar fate.
V. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
A. Background
This Part will examine negotiations between the United States and eight
127
other Asia-Pacific partners. Throughout the negotiation process, there has been
119. See id. at 353-54. Most signatories to FTAs include references in their agreements to further the
goals of the Doha Declaration.
120. Correa, supra note 102, at 82.
121. CAFTA provides five-year exclusivity for marketing data of a patented product. During this time,
third parties (for example, a generics manufacturer) may not “market a product on the basis of (1) the
information, or (2) the approval granted to the person who submitted the information . . .” Dominican RepublicCentral America Free Trade Agreement art. 15.10.1(a), Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA]. This
is in-line with the data exclusivity that the United States affords to patent holders. 21 U.S.C. § 335(c)(3)(E)(ii)
(2001); see also Fellmeth, supra note 61, at 447-48 (comparing data exclusivity systems in the United States
and European Union with practices in developing countries).
122. CAFTA, supra note 121, at art. 15.10.2.
123. Id. at art. 15.1.7.
124. See Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 5, 2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file697_3975.pdf.
125. Id.
126. See supra Part III.D.
127. The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
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considerable concern expressed by all participating countries with respect to the
proposed intellectual property provisions, probably in light of the fact that these
are agreements between developed countries with a strong pharmaceutical
128
presence and developing countries with little to none.
The TPPA is a developing agreement between the United States, Australia,
129
Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. In
October 2011, Japan began evaluating whether they would join the negotiations
130
as well. In November, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit,
131
Mexico, Canada, and the Philippines also expressed interest, though as of
132
October 2011, these countries had not begun the formal accession process.
Negotiations began for the TPPA in March 2010, and since then negotiations
133
have gone through several subsequent rounds.
The TPPA is unlike any other trade agreement in that it departs from the
bilateral model and attempts to harmonize the hundreds of “overlapping and
134
inconsistent [free trade agreements] proliferating the globe.” The end goal is a
“living” agreement with comprehensive coverage and eventual expansion of the
135
agreement to include more Asia-Pacific economies in the future. To achieve the
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership
(last
visited July 15, 2012).
128. See e.g., Krista Cox, KEI Notes From Eighth Round of TPPA Negotiations (Sep. 18, 2011, 4:22
PM), KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, http://keionline.org/node/1263 (“As a whole, it appears that there is
growing and vocal opposition to USTR’s aggressive IP positions.”); EU-India Free Trade Agreement: Generic
Medications Under Threat, Says UN Health Expert, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10592&LangID=E%22%3Enews%2
0release (commenting that “[t]he EU-India draft FTA, as it stands, places trade interests over human rights.
. . .”).
129. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr. gov/tpp
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
130. Press Release, Deputy Chief James P. Zumwalt, U.S. Embassy, Japan, DCM Zumwalt Welcomes
Discussion of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://japan.usembassy.
gov/e/p/tp-20111014-01.html. The addition of Japan to the TPPA would be significant because the policies of
Japan and the United States are similar and there is a history of policy-sharing and collaboration between the
two countries. See Toshiko Takenaka, The Current Status of U.S.-Japan IPR Systems: Convergence,
Cooperation, and Conflict, CTR. ON JAPANESE ECON. & BUS., COLUM. UNIV. BUS. SCH., 3 (Feb. 15, 2002),
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:113290.
131. Pablo Garibian & Rachelle Younglai, Canada, Mexico Ask to Join Pan-Pacific Trade Talks,
REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/us-apec-canada-tpp-idUSTRE7 AC12
B20111114.
132. Krista Cox, KEI Notes from the Ninth Round of TPPA Negotiations, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L
(Oct. 28, 2011, 11:51 AM), http://keionline.org/node/1306.
133. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 129.
134. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s
Clothing, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 28, 39-40 (2011).
135. Id.; Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders’ Statement, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 12,
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/november/trans-pacific-partner ship-leadersstatement; The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Ministers’ Report to Leaders, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/ 2011/november/transpacific-partnership-tpp-trade-ministers’-re.
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type of expansion the leaders seek, the agreement must be one that attracts other
participants. However, Meredith Kolsky Lewis warns, “[the] more TPP[A] looks
like a series of bilateral U.S. FTAs with exclusions for products the United States
considers sensitive, the less likely the TPP[A] will attract other countries to
136
accede.” This warning is particularly applicable in light of the United States’
stated objective “to negotiate trade agreements in terms of [intellectual property
137
rights] that ‘reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law,’”
meaning, a push for TRIPS-plus provisions. As is true in past U.S. FTA
negotiations, intellectual property rights are proving to be a “sticking points” in
138
TPPA negotiations.
139
Negotiations of the TPPA have been notoriously secretive. This has created
concerns, in the United States and elsewhere, about accountability of government
140
officials. In addition, the concern stems from the trend of private interests
141
having a heavy influence on public international lawmaking. Though private
industry actors may not sit in the negotiations, it is clear that they have
142
omnipresence, “closely monitoring and critiquing the state of play.”
This concern was exacerbated when two drafts of the intellectual property
143
rights chapter were leaked, one in February 2011 and one in September 2011.
Both drafts, which are indicators of what has been negotiated, contained a cover
note saying that it would not be declassified until four years after entry into the
144
TPPA. Secret negotiations can lead to an unbalanced final agreement. For
example, a recently negotiated intellectual property treaty, the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), also shrouded its negotiations in
secrecy; the end result is a text resembling the entertainment industry’s wish
145
list. Peter K. Yu identifies four public-interest concerns about ACTA’s secret
136. Lewis, supra note 134, at 52.
137. IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 11 (2010).
138. Id.
139. Jane Kelsey, Trans-Pacific Partnership Papers Remain Secret for Four Years After Deal, TPP
WATCH (Oct. 16, 2011), http://tppwatch.org/2011/10/16/trans-pacific-partnership-papers-remain-secret-forfour-years-after-deal/.
140. Id. In New Zealand, for example, the secrecy of the negotiations prompted a response from
citizens. A sign-on letter was drafted addressing the Prime Minister of New Zealand, urging that TPP texts be
released. Open Letter ‘Release the TPPA Text’ Sign-on Letter, TPP WATCH (Feb. 10, 2011), http://tppwatch.
org/what-is-tppa/release-the-text/.
141. Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1595-99 (2011).
142. Id.
143. Kelsey, supra note 139; The Complete Feb. 10, 2011 Text of the US Proposal for the TPP IPR
Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 10, 2011), http://keionline.org/node/1091 (positing that U.S.
drafts should be available to the public especially when copies are distributed to all the negotiating states).
144. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft, art. 8.6(c)-(e) (Sept. 2011),
available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf (leaked text).
145. Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 464 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV.
975, 977 n.4 (2011).
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negotiations: “(1) lack of transparency; (2) very limited public, non-industry
participation; (3) a huge democratic deficit; and (4) virtually no domestic or
146
global accountability.”
These same concerns are applicable to TPPA
negotiations. Using ACTA as an indicator of what secret negotiations can
produce, the end text of the TPPA has the potential to be a reiteration of the
147
pharmaceutical industry’s wish list.
B. Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines and the September 2011 Leaked TPPA
Text
Round Eight of TPPA negotiations, held in Chicago, concluded on
148
September 15, 2011. During these negotiations, the Office of the United States
149
Trade Representative (“USTR”) released a white paper outlining a new
150
strategic initiative: Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines (“TEAM”).
According to the paper, as part of implementing TEAM, the United States has
made trade proposals during TPPA negotiations “that are aimed at promoting
151
access to medicines in [TPPA] partner markets.” Listed as one of the goals for
the TPPA is the reaffirming commitment to the DOHA Declaration and to
“[i]ncorporate important understandings on the availability of public health
152
measures, based on the DOHA Declaration . . . .” While acknowledgement of
the DOHA Declaration in TPPA is important in terms of preserving TRIPS
153
flexibilities, the general language used in this white paper frustrated many,
especially in light of the fact that so little is known about what actually is going
154
on in the negotiations. Another TEAM TPPA goal that has received criticism is
155
the “TPP access window.” The white paper proposes that “pharmaceutical-

146. Yu, supra note 145, at 998-99.
147. Sell, supra note 145, at 464.
148. Cox, supra note 128; Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 129.
149. Generally, the term “white paper” is used to describe a government report.
150. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 129; Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to
Medicines, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/webfm _send/3059 (last visited Nov. 11,
2012).
151. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, supra note 150.
152. Id.
153. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 353-58 (discussing inclusion of “Doha” language in sub-sequent
agreements as a way to preserve flexibilities established in TRIPS).
154. James Love, USTR Releases New White Paper on Access to Medicine: Includes Almost No
Specifics in Terms of Negotiating Positions, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 12, 2011), http://
keionline.org/node/1262.
155. See Deborah Gleeson, Trade Talks Set to Undermine Access to Medicines for the World’s Poor,
THE CONVERSATION (Sep. 16, 2011), http://theconversation.edu.au/trade-talks-set-to-undermine-access-tomedicines-for-the-worlds-poor-3392; see also Brook K. Baker, US Trade-Enhancing Access to Medicines
(Access Window) in its Proposed TPP IP Text is a Sham, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://infojustice.org/resource-library/trans-pacific-partnership/us-trade-enhancing-access-to-medicines-accesswindow-in-its-proposed-tpp-ip-text-is-a-sham.
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specific intellectual property protections” be available, provided that the
156
pharmaceutical introduces medicines within an expedited time frame. This
language is also general, however, when a new draft was leaked of the USTR’s
proposal for the TPPA, the pharmaceutical-specific intellectual property
protections manifested through provisions allowing longer patent terms to
157
158
compensate for granting delays, data exclusivity, and patent-registration
159
linkage.
The access window applies where a TPPA party allows a patent applicant “to
obtain approval for marketing a new . . . product in its territory by relying, in
whole or in part, on the prior approval of the . . . product by the regulatory
160
authority in another [country].” By contrast, where a country does not rely on
patents elsewhere to grant approval domestically, these provisions will be
161
“automatic and absolute.” Where the access window is applicable, satisfying its
early-access requirements is relatively easy: a pharmaceutical may begin the
approval process by relying on any available information, including prior
162
approval by another country. To complete the patent registration, a party may
163
impose additional requirements, but, in the context of applying the access
window provisions, satisfying these requirements will “necessarily [occur] after
164
the commencement of the marketing approval process.”
165
While the access window may help to “drive access,” longer patent terms,
data exclusivity, and patent-registration linkage may be too high of a price to
pay. For developing and least developed countries, expedited physical access to
patented medications does not solve the problem of pricing which inherently
166
inhibits meaningful access to lifesaving drugs. In the context of HIV
medications, there is a severe price differential between branded and generic
167
drugs. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that HIV becomes resistant of
168
first-line drugs, which generally do have affordable generics available. This
169
necessitates switching to second and third-line drugs. However, pricing of

156. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, supra note 150.
157. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft, supra note 144, at art.
8.6(c)-(e).
158. See id. at art. 9.2.
159. Id. at art. 9.5.
160. Id. at art. 9.4, 9.6, 8.6(e).
161. Baker, supra note 155.
162. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft, supra note 144, at art. 9.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, supra note 150.
166. Gleeson, supra note 155.
167. Background: Access to Antiretrovirals, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERS, http://utw.msfaccess.org/back
ground (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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second-line drugs is “over six times more than the most affordable first-line
regimen” and a potential third-line drug could cost “[twenty] times more than the
170
most affordable . . . first line regimen.” Therefore, while the drugs may be
available, they will be priced out of reach for years before the requisite testing
and registration of a generic patent can make the drug available at an affordable
price point. Even when an affordable generic does become available, the virus
171
may have again become immune, making the generic obsolete. Professor Brook
172
K. Baker provides insightful criticism of the access window text, namely on
how the interplay between provisions will generally lead to longer patent terms,
173
which cancel out any benefit of expedited access. He argues, “[t]he desirability
of earlier product introduction should have nothing to do with a trade off
involving greater [intellectual property] protections that extend and strengthen
174
drug company patent and data-related monopolies.”
The ninth round of negotiations, which took place in Lima, Peru, concluded
175
on October 28, 2011. Though the previously leaked USTR proposal was not
discussed, international disapproval over the contents of the leaked text was more
176
than just background noise. On October 25, 2011, Peruvian groups staged a
177
demonstration and appeared on the evening news. Additionally, during this
round, various groups and individuals circulated five letters containing over
eighty signatures imploring their respective countries to increase transparency of
178
the negotiations by releasing negotiating text and guidelines.
In the March 2012 round of negotiations, for the first time since the U.S. text
179
was leaked, patent protection discussions focused on the “access window.” An
observer noted that the concept seemed to get little support, and stakeholder
organizations from at least four Trans-Pacific Partnership countries heavily
180
criticized it.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Baker is a law professor at Northeastern University School of Law, a board chair, and policy
analyst for Health GAP (Global Access Project).
173. Baker, supra note 155.
174. Id.
175. Cox, supra note 132.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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C. What Next?

181

Since March 2012, the United States has been markedly more inclusive in its
official coverage of TPP negotiations. The USTR website now features a blog
182
and links to its Twitter and Facebook pages. Prior to the twelfth round of
negotiations, which were held on May 8–18, 2012, in Dallas, Texas, the office
183
had only been issuing “updates” at the close of each round. The Dallas round
184
also marked a step in the direction of more transparency. According to the
USTR, “more than 300 stakeholders from non-governmental organizations,
academia, business, and the public” were invited to present their views directly to
185
negotiators. In response to concerns from Congress and the public regarding
Internet freedom issues, the USTR took steps to be more transparent by releasing
186
an outline of proposals that would touch on those issues. This may be a signal
that communication and transparency between negotiators and the public in
187
general are on an upward trend. Specifically for public health advocates, it may
mean that transparency in the pharmaceutical-related proposals will follow
188
closely behind.
V. CONCLUSION
While pharmaceutical interests have historically been well-represented, the
public-health lobby has grown exponentially in size and resources. It is no longer
appropriate to view the battle between increased intellectual property rights and
protection of public-health objectives as one that is fought between mismatched
opponents. Public health professionals, non-governmental organizations, legal
scholars, and whole governments have all responded to free trade agreements
such as CAFTA, and most recently to the potential Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement. The demand of the public-health lobby is clear: stop building trade
181. For up-to-date- information regarding TPP negotiation rounds, see TPP Blog, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-outreachand-updates (last visited July 12, 2012).
182. Id.; OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
183. See TPP Blog, supra note 181.
184. See U.S. Welcomes Stakeholders to 12th Round of Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks, OFF. OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (May 10, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/
blog/2012/may/US-Welcomes-Stakeholders-to-TPP-Talks.
185. Id.
186. See Zach Carter, Obama Trade Policy Seeks To Include Exceptions In Trans-Pacific Partnership,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2012, 4:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/03/obama-trade-policytrans-pacific-partnership-ron-kirk-ustr_n_1646921.html.
187. Id.
188. Negotiations continued in San Diego, California in July. During that round, USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk
sent letters to Congress notifying them of Canada and Mexico’s inclusion in TPP negotiations. Important Progress
Made at TPP Talks in San Diego, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (July 2012), http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/2012/july/ important-progress-tpp-talks-san-diego.
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agreements with restrictions that operate to render TRIPS flexibilities useless and
push out generic competition.
189
“Prices fall as generic competition increases.” When countries are obligated to
incorporate intellectual property rights that stifle generic competition, prohibitive
pricing continues to block access to essential medicines like anti-retrovirals for
HIV/AIDS patients. At the end of the day, each of the protections discussed in this
Comment (data exclusivity, prohibition of parallel importation, and
patent/registration linkage) make meaningful generic competition nearly impossible.
Furthermore, when waiting for market-entry of a generic is impracticable in the face
of a health crisis, TRIPS flexibilities like compulsory licensing are rendered useless
190
because TRIPS-plus obligations effectively block the use of them. The DOHA
Declaration was supposed to make public health a priority. However, a patent
scheme that allows for public-health measures in theory, but in its application,
prohibits such measures cannot be said to comply with TRIPS and the DOHA
Declaration.
As it stands, the United States’ proposal for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement includes data exclusivity, patent/registration linkage, and longer patent
191
terms in general, all of which are masked in the TEAM approach as a tradeoff for
192
expedited access.
One size certainly does not fit all. Broadly speaking, in a “living” agreement like
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, it is essential that policy space be kept
open so that lesser-developed countries may take advantage of the other benefits of
the agreement without giving away their ability to respond to the health needs of
193
their citizens. While it is impractical to suggest that the agreement contain no
TRIPS-plus intellectual property rights, it is irresponsible to include all of them
without regard to how countries can continue to use TRIPS flexibilities to provide
access to essential drugs.
In June 2011, at the conclusion of a United Nations High Level Meeting on
AIDS, governments pledged to extend the reach of HIV treatment to nine million
194
more patients. To reach this goal, pricing of treatment must come down. This can

189. Background: Access to Antiretrovirals, supra note 167.
190. See Harris, supra note 28, at 390-94.
191. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft, supra note 144, at art. 9.2,
9.5. While the proposed chapter on pharmaceuticals did not address parallel imports, a ban has been proposed in
the context of copyrighted goods. Based on the USTR’s advocacy of harmonizing the agreement’s provisions
with that of U.S. law, it is likely that a ban on parallel importation could be incorporated. See E.D. Kain, IP
Protection Standards in TPP Represent the Downside of The Trans-Pacific Partnership, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012,
12:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/ 2012/01/25/ip-protection-standards-in-tpp-represent-thedark-side-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership/.
192. Compare Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, supra note 150,
with Baker, supra note 155.
193. See Lewis, supra note 134 (discussing the TPPA as a new type of agreement requiring negotiation
tactics that depart from merely pushing the U.S. intellectual property model in its entirety).
194. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, supra note 8, at 8
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only happen if countries can utilize compulsory licensing and enjoy the benefits of
195
generic competition. Developing countries must have the flexibility to account for
196
this continuing public crisis. This will not come to fruition unless future trade
agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, resist the temptation
to burden all parties with intellectual property obligations that mirror U.S. domestic
law.

195. Id. at 7-8.
196. Id. at 8.
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